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   The Hindsight Bias Effect (HBE) describes the 
observation that once people are aware of the outcome to a 
situation, they have the tendency to falsely believe that they 
would have predicted the true outcome (see Guilbault et al., 
2004). Historically, the most popular explanations for this 
effect can be described as Cognitive Reconstruction Models 
of retrospective judgment formation (Hawkins & Hastie, 
1990).   These theories propose that hindsight bias occurs 
when people do not or cannot directly recall their initial 
judgment at the point of retrospection.  Therefore, people 
attempt to reconstruct their original predictive judgment by 
re-judging the situation anew.  All of these theories propose 
that the knowledge of the outcome somehow affects the 
information or cues used in this reconstruction process, 
thereby leading to retrospective judgments that are more in 
favor of the given outcome. However, these Cognitive 
Reconstruction theories all propose different mechanisms 
for reconstruction which lead to diverging predictions about 
what variables should moderate the HBE.   
  A Creeping Determinism Model predicts that outcome 
knowledge reinforces outcome supporting information so 
that it is more available at the time of reconstruction 
(Wasserman, Lempert & Hastie, 1991).  An Anchor and 
Adjust Model predicts that people will use the given 
outcome as an anchor and reconstruct their judgment by 
adjusting away from the given outcome based on ones 
expertise in the domain (Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003).  A 
Sense-making Model proposes that unexpected outcomes 
cause people to engage in problem solving processes to 
reconcile their situation model with the unexpected 
outcome, thereby leading to a new representation that gives 
more weight to the outcome supporting information (Pezzo, 
2003).  Finally, a Meta-cognitive Cue Model proposes that 
people reconstruct their initial opinion by assessing their 
feeling of surprise based on the outcome as a cue. This 
theory proposes expected outcomes lead people to feel 
overconfident about their predictive accuracy (Ofir & 
Mazursky, 1997). These models produce different 
predictions about the role that expectation should play in 
moderating the HBE and the role of memory in the 
phenomenon.  
Method 
  The present study used a within-subjects, scenario based 
hindsight bias paradigm to test the predictions of the 
opposing Cognitive Reconstruction Models of the Hindsight 
Bias Effect.  One hundred thirty-five undergraduates were 
asked to read a text about an upcoming tennis match that 
described the strengths and weaknesses of each player.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two texts that 
presented 21 pieces of information favoring one player 
(More Supported Player) and   13 pieces of information 
favoring the other player (Less Supported Player). 
Participants then rated the probability of the possible 
outcomes (Prediction).  Next, participants were randomly 
assigned an outcome passage that informed them which 
player won the match. This created two Expectation 
conditions (more supported player outcome = Expected, less 
supported player outcome = Unexpected).  Then participants 
rated how surprising they found the outcome.  A week later 
participants returned and attempted to remember their 
original rating (Retrospection) and performed a free recall 
memory test. 
Results and Discussion  
    Results supported that our Expectation manipulation was 
successful. Those in the Unexpected condition rated the 
outcome as significantly more surprising than those in the 
Expected condition.  Comparison of the Predictive and 
Retrospective Judgments revealed a significant effect of the 
Expectation manipulation on the HBE. There was no 
difference between Predictive and Retrospective Judgments 
in the Expected outcome condition. However, the Unexpected 
outcome group showed the standard HBE with Retrospective 
Judgments favoring the given outcome more than the 
Predictive Judgments.  Although Expectation moderated the 
HBE, the memory results showed that it did not change the 
effect of outcome knowledge on free recall.  Both of the 
groups recalled more information that was consistent with the 
outcome they were given.  Only a Sense-Making Model of 
the HBE is consistent with this pattern of surprise, hindsight 
bias, and memory results.   
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